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ANXIETY AND ATTENTIONAL BIAS AND WORKING MEMORY

Abstract
Research has shown that anxiety impairs attention and working memory, especially when
it comes to completing a mentally demanding cognitive task such as the emotional Stroop
paradigm or the n-back task. The purpose of this study was to investigate whether state
anxiety affects behavioral performance on executive function tasks. State anxiety was
induced using negatively valenced images from the International Affective Picture
System, while neutral images served as the control. We compared behavioral
performance between individuals in the negative mood induction against those in the
neutral mood induction. Trait anxiety was used as a covariate for both groups. This
allowed us to determine whether state anxiety, as apposed to trait anxiety, plays a
significant role in interfering with attentional control or working memory systems.
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The Effects Anxiety has on Attentional Bias and Working Memory
Anxiety is a common and natural reaction to stress and can prove to be life saving
in certain life or death situations (Kessler, Chiu, Demler, & Walters, 2005). However,
anxiety can also pose a problem for individuals who experience “severe” chronic anxiety.
According to Kessler and colleagues (2005), approximately 18.1% of the U.S. adult
population experiences this chronic level of anxiety over a 12-month time period, and
28.8% of the U.S. adult population struggle with severe anxiety over their lifetime. There
are numerous anxiety disorders that are currently specified in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.; DSM–5; American Psychiatric
Association [APA], 2013). According to the DSM-5, specific phobia, social anxiety
disorder (social phobia), and generalized anxiety disorder are the most common forms of
anxiety in the U.S. (APA, 2013). With respect to suicidality, the most severe anxiety
disorders include specific phobia; individuals with this diagnosis are 60% more likely to
attempt suicide, and panic disorder, which also has an increased risk of suicide (APA,
2013).
The common criteria for all anxiety disorders require the feelings of fear, panic,
and/or anxiety to remain prevalent for a substantial period of time (typically six months
or more), as opposed to these feelings persisting in a transient state (APA, 2013). Thus,
one of the main diagnostic differences between typical anxious feelings and a
classification of an anxiety disorder is the duration for which the feeling is endured. At
times, especially considering certain environmental contexts, it is normal for an
individual to experience feelings of anxiety or worry. It has been shown in previous
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research (Sheppes, Luria, Fukuda, & Gross, 2013) that these fleeting feelings serve as a
survival tactic, alerting the individual to possible danger and influencing whether to stay
and “fight” the danger head on, or leave the danger for safety (“flight”). Non-anxious
individuals experience normal levels of vigilance in assessing potential threats to
homeostasis. Being in a state of anxiety leads to hypervigilant behavior in which threat is
detected at a much lower threshold (Van Marle, Hermans, Qin, & Fernandez, 2009).
Therefore, anxiety disorders, as well as individuals suffering with severe, chronic anxiety
(without an anxiety disorder diagnosis) can be maladaptive and distressing. Conversely,
experiencing a temporary state of anxiety is healthy and can aid in survival.
State and Trait Anxiety
There are two different ways that anxiety manifests: trait anxiety and state
anxiety. According to Crowe, Matthews, and Walkenhorst (2007), trait anxiety can be
viewed as a personality dimension, while state anxiety can be viewed as a situational
dimension. In essence, trait anxiety is defined as the more stable, unchanging aspect of
anxiety that is inherent in a person, while state anxiety is ever changing, depending on the
current situation and environment. For example, it has been posited that trait anxiety is a
result of a person’s development of specific coping mechanisms that involve regulating
his/her mood to deal with life stressors (Eysenck & Derakshan, 2009). While trait anxiety
implies a consistent presence of anxiety over a period of time, it does not follow that the
individual is in a constant state of worry and apprehension that impairs every aspect of
his/her cognitive performance (Eysenck & Derakshan, 2009). Rather, individuals with
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high trait anxiety respond differently to stressful situations compared to individuals low
in trait anxiety.
When discussing anxiety it is important to briefly review the similarities and
differences between anxiety and stress, as they are related constructs. Much like anxiety
may be present either as a state or trait, stress may be experienced either chronically or
acutely. Chronic stress and acute stress are interrelated in that chronic stress regularly has
an impact on acute stress. The extent to which a current stressful situation has an impact
on a person’s response to the stressor is partly attributed to individual differences
(Constantinou et al., 2009). One aspect of these differences includes the perceived level
of chronic stress he/she has had to endure. Therefore, if a person scores relatively high on
a chronic stress inventory, this could influence whether the person is subsequently more
affected by an acute stressor than someone who scores lower on the same inventory
(Constantinou et al., 2009).
However, anxiety and stress are still separate constructs. This is evident in the
Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS), which has different subscale items that relate
to the different aspects of depression, anxiety, and stress (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995).
The anxiety subscale includes measures of autonomic arousal, situational anxiety,
skeletal musculature effects, and subjective experience of anxious affect, while the stress
subscale includes measures of difficulty relaxing, nervous arousal, easily upset/agitated,
irritable/over-reactive, and impatient (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). Thus, while anxiety
and stress are similar, they encompass different aspects of negative affect that a person
may experience.
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It is possible to induce temporary anxiety (i.e., state anxiety) in an individual
regardless of whether he/she is generally an anxious individual. This is referred to as
sensitized anxiety and it can be induced after just one exposure to an acute stressor
(Grillon, Duncko, Covington, Kopperman, & Kling, 2007). Researchers have employed
various techniques to induce sensitized anxiety in participants, ranging from the
anticipation of an aversive stimulus to exposure to mood states. Rhudy and Meagher
(2000) told participants they would receive a painful shock, and allowed the anticipation
of the shock (which never came) to generate anxiety. Participants can also be exposed to
specific mood states by having them read aloud self-statements such as “I feel very
anxious/worried about a future event,” or by having them imagine giving an impromptu
speech in front of a crowd (Orton, Beiman, LaPointe, & Lankford, 1983). Mood states
can also be induced by having participants view emotionally salient film clips or images
that perpetuate the intended mood (Fales et al., 2008; Sanchez, Vazquez, Gomez, &
Joormann, 2013).
One line of inquiry that remains equivocal is the degree to which trait anxiety
interacts with state anxiety brought on by an acute stressor. While some researchers have
shown that trait anxiety does not impact a person’s level of state anxiety (Dresler,
Meriau, Heekeren, & Van der Meer, 2009), others have shown that it does (Eysenck,
Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). These conflicting findings may be due in part to the
multiple ways in which individuals process emotion. Rusting (1998) discussed three
different routes to emotional processing: the traditional approach, a moderation approach,
and a mediation approach. The traditional approach posits that temporary mood states
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and stable personality traits each have independent effects on emotional processing
(Rusting, 1998). For example, someone who is not high in trait anxiety could still feel an
overwhelming amount of state anxiety when placed in a situation that the individual finds
highly uncomfortable (e.g. being asked to ride a roller coaster with a very steep drop).
This activity may be very anxiety provoking in that moment even for someone who is not
considered an “anxious” person, as heights are frequently reported as a “fear” (LoBue,
2013). The second approach, the moderation approach, Rusting suggests that personality
traits may moderate the relationship between mood states and emotional processing. In
other words, whether an individual processes emotional stimuli in a mood-congruent or a
mood-incongruent manner would depend on his/her personality traits. Mood congruency
refers to an individual retrieving pleasant thoughts and associations more easily when in a
good mood, because pleasant associations have already been activated within the
emotional network (Rusting, 1998). The opposite is true as well: an individual in a bad
mood will more easily recall unpleasant thoughts and associations (Rusting, 1998). For
example, someone who is high in trait anxiety would suffer the negative consequences of
being in a state of anxiety much more so than someone low in trait anxiety, due to the
nature of his/her emotional processing. Finally, the third approach, the mediation
approach, suggests that the effect of an individual’s personality traits on the processing of
emotional stimuli may be mediated by the individual’s current mood state (Rusting,
1998). In other words, the effects of personality trait on emotional processing may be
indirect rather than direct. An example of this is that an individual’s personality (trait
anxiety) may make him/her more susceptible to certain mood states (state anxiety), which
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leads to mood-congruent processing of emotional stimuli when placed in an anxious
state. To summarize, while mood states and personality traits have effects irrespective of
each other, they also have a reciprocal relationship when combined that impacts the
individual and how he/she responds to certain situations. Further research is needed to
understand more clearly how trait and state anxiety affect emotional processing.
Attentional Control Theory
According to the attentional control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007), anxiety affects
the cognitive domains of attention and memory. With respect to attention, anxiety makes
it difficult to remain focused on the task at hand when stimuli are presented that are
perceived as threatening. Anxiety also makes it difficult to keep information in working
memory (discussed in further detail below), a short-term, dynamic memory register that
allows people to manipulate information in the present. People with high trait anxiety
have less “room” in this memory register to store information than people with low
anxiety, which makes tasks involving working memory harder for them (Eysenck, Payne,
& Derakshan, 2005). This difficulty manifests in slower reaction times in order to
preserve accuracy levels. This tradeoff of reduced speed for accuracy is key to attentional
control theory, and warrants further explanation.
When analyzing performance, it is important to differentiate between the concept
of performance efficiency and that of performance effectiveness. Effectiveness can be
referred to as response accuracy, or the number of items that are answered correctly,
while efficiency encompasses the relationship between accuracy (effectiveness), the
amount of effort expended, and the resources recruited to obtain the correct response
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(Eysenck et al., 2007). Essentially, effectiveness takes into account more details than
simply whether or not the response was accurate, such as how much mental effort the
person had to put forth in order to compensate for deficiencies in other areas. Typically,
as more resources are forcefully used due to task complexity and/or deficits in other areas
(such as working memory capacity), efficiency deteriorates (Eysenck et al., 2007).
Anxiety typically impairs performance efficiency, not performance effectiveness
(Edwards, Edwards, & Lyvers, 2015). In other words, high-anxious people can perform a
task with the same level of accuracy as their low-anxious counterparts; however, it will
require more effort and resources in order to accomplish this. This phenomenon
manifests in the form of high-anxious individuals taking longer to respond correctly (i.e.,
longer response latency) on attention and memory tasks than low-anxious individuals,
resulting in an overall slower reaction time.
Evidence of this speed/accuracy tradeoff in high-trait anxious individuals comes
from Edwards and colleagues (2010). Their results showed that individuals higher in trait
anxiety were forced to rely on other cognitive resources, besides task-related cognitive
control, in order to achieve equivalent accuracy as individuals lower in trait anxiety. They
concluded that these extra cognitive resources could include extra motivation or working
memory capacity (Edwards, Burt, & Lip, 2010). Eysenck et al. (2007) found that when
low-trait- and high-trait-anxious individuals have comparable performance effectiveness
on an attention task, group differences in efficiency can be deduced from differences in
response time. In this study, high-trait-anxiety performance was comparable to low-traitanxiety performance, but with longer response latencies for the high-trait-anxious
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participants (Eysenck et al., 2007). This means that low-trait- and high-trait-anxious
individuals will “get the right answer” the same amount of times, but high-trait-anxious
individuals will take longer to process the “right answer,” which will be evident in the
length of time it takes them to respond to the task.
Attentional Bias
Anxious individuals tend to be more distracted by threatening stimuli as opposed
to neutral or positive stimuli, referred to as attentional bias (Eysenck et al., 2007). Due to
anxious individuals’ hypervigilant tendencies, they have a harder time both ignoring
stimuli they perceive as threatening, and disengaging from perceived threatening stimuli
while performing a task (Eysenck et al., 2007). Derakshan and Koster (2010) found that
high-trait-anxious, but not low-trait-anxious individuals, were slower to detect a happy
face in an angry crowd. This finding exemplifies the difficulty high-anxious individuals
experience when attempting to disengage from threatening stimuli (i.e., angry faces).
This difficulty may be due to the fact that emotional stimuli are processed earlier in the
processing stream than neutral stimuli, a phenomenon referred to as “attention capture”
(Chajut, Schupak & Algom, 2010). In addition, emotional stimuli hold attention longer
than do neutral stimuli, exacerbating the already difficult challenge of disengaging,
referred to as a temporary freezing behavior (Chajut et al., 2010). Typically, high-traitanxious individuals allocate their available attentional resources to the perceived threat as
opposed to maintaining their attentional resources on the task at hand.
According to attentional control theory, anxiety causes this distraction to
threatening stimuli because of its association with an increased influence of the stimulus-

10

ANXIETY AND ATTENTIONAL BIAS AND WORKING MEMORY

driven (i.e., bottom-up) attentional network and a decreased influence of the goal-directed
(i.e., top-down) attentional network (Eysenck et al., 2007). The stimulus-driven
attentional system forces the individual to pay attention first and foremost to whichever
distracting stimulus is in the environment, regardless of the task at hand. In contrast, the
goal-directed attentional system forces the individual to focus attention on the task at
hand, or the completion of a certain goal, regardless of what distracting stimulus is
present in the environment. Anxiety stimulates activation of the stimulus-driven
attentional system and inhibits activation of the goal-directed attentional system for the
individual. Consequently, anxiety shifts the immediate priority to threat assessment,
causing the individual to disengage from the task at hand in order to ensure the
distracting stimulus is not a threat to safety. Thus, individuals high in trait anxiety have a
harder time overriding the stimulus-driven attentional process (Eysenck et al., 2007).
The emotional Stroop task (e-Stroop; Watts, McKenna, Sharrock, & Trezise,
1986; Williams & Nulty, 1986) is a valid measure of attentional bias, capable of
demonstrating how difficult it is for anxious individuals to inhibit task irrelevant
information (De Ruiter & Brosschot, 1994). It is a variation of the Stroop color-word task
(Stroop, 1935) that requires an individual to name the color of the ink in which a word is
presented, ignoring the semantic meaning of the word, which in some cases is the name
of another color. This response conflict from competing information slows response time
(i.e., Stroop interference). In order to respond quickly and accurately, the participant must
inhibit the automatic tendency to read and interpret the word’s meaning. Rather than
using color-related words, the e-Stroop uses words with an emotional connotation,
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including threat-related words (e.g., snake; Watts et al., 1986), positive words (e.g.,
happy; Bailey, Paret, Battista, & Xue, 2012), as well as neutral words (e.g., table; De
Ruiter & Brosschot, 1994). Participants take longer to name the color of the ink for threat
words due to an inability to ignore the semantic content (De Ruiter & Brosschot, 1994).
This threat-induced response latency is referred to as e-Stroop interference, and is evident
in all participants, not just those with high levels of anxiety (De Ruiter & Brosschot,
1994). However, Mogg and colleagues (1990) found that high levels of trait anxiety were
positively related to the magnitude of e-Stroop interference. In other words, individuals
with high-trait-anxiety are even slower than individuals low in trait anxiety to identify the
color of the ink for threat words.
A similar study also found that e-Stroop interference was evident in threat-related
words, as opposed to neutral or positive words, for high-trait-anxious individuals
(Richards & French, 1990). Interestingly, individuals with an anxiety disorder
(generalized anxiety disorder and social phobia) demonstrate e-Stroop interference to
threat-related words when the words are content specific (Becker, Rinck, Margraf, &
Roth, 2001). For example, instead of using random words that pertain to threat, choosing
a specific category, such as a specific phobia, results in slower reaction times for highanxious individuals participating in the e-Stroop task. Thus, high-trait-anxious
individuals show particular difficulty disengaging from high threat words, while nontrait-anxious individuals do not.
Differences in how low-trait- and high-trait-anxious individuals respond to stimuli
are not limited to exposure to threat and/or category-specific words. High-trait-anxious
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individuals have been shown to interpret neutral or ambiguous stimuli as being more
threatening (referred to as interpretation bias) than low-trait-anxious individuals (Van
Bockstaele et al., 2014). Another difference between high-trait- and low-trait-anxious
individuals lies in how they direct their attention to threatening stimuli. High-traitanxious individuals tend to allocate their attention towards threatening information,
whereas low-trait-anxious individuals tend to allocate their attention away from
threatening information, a phenomenon known as biased attentional direction (Wilson &
MacLeod, 2003). Furthermore, when the threat stimulus is perceived as having
intermediate intensity, high-trait-anxious individuals will display greater attentional
orientation towards it than low-trait-anxious individuals (Wilson & MacLeod, 2003). For
low-trait-anxious individuals, there tends to be more of a “what was it?” response to
threatening stimuli as opposed to a “what is it?” response (Bailey, Paret, Battista, & Xue,
2012). Importantly, high-trait-anxious individuals have a harder time ignoring
distracting/threatening stimuli and feel the need to process the stimuli immediately to
determine whether or not there is imminent danger in the present moment (“what is
that?”). Conversely, low-trait-anxious individuals do not experience this dilemma. They
are better able to ignore distracting/threatening stimuli in order to finish the task at hand,
and process the stimuli once the task is complete (“what was that?”).
An explanation for why high-trait anxious individuals respond differently to
threatening stimuli may be because of differences in the activation patterns of neural
networks that process threat. The amygdala is involved in the processing and evaluation
of emotional stimuli, especially fear (Ragen, Roach, & Chollak, 2016). Individuals
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exposed to chronic stress have an exaggerated fear response including over-activation of
the amygdala (Ragen et al., 2016). In high-trait-anxious individuals, a large proportion of
amygdala activation is predicted to occur within the first 500-600 milliseconds (ms) of
threatening stimulus presentation, whereas with low-trait-anxious individuals it is
predicted that the amygdala comes online later in the processing stream (Frewen, Dozois,
Joanisse, & Neufeld, 2008). According to Wilson and MacLeod (2003), all individuals
shift focus away from very low threat (avoidance) and all individuals shift focus towards
very high threat (vigilance). The difference between low-trait and high-trait anxious
individuals lies in the response to intermediate threat intensity; high-trait anxious
individuals experience attentional vigilance starting at lower threat intensity. However, it
has been proposed that high-trait-anxious individuals view any given level of stimulus as
more threatening than low-trait-anxious individuals (Wilson & MacLeod, 2003). This
tendency of high-trait-anxious individuals to perceive threat in any stimulus could be
explained as anxiety being associated with a lower threshold for perceiving threat, such
that even moderately threatening stimuli evoke a response among anxious individuals
(Bailey et al., 2012).
State anxiety, as opposed to anxiety in general, might be the cause of the e-Stroop
interference of emotional words for high-anxious individuals reported above. According
to Dresler and colleagues (2009), state anxiety is what biases one’s attention towards the
emotionally salient stimuli. Dresler and colleagues found that trait anxiety did not have a
significant effect on reaction time for high-state- or low-state-anxious individuals;
instead, they found that state anxiety specifically caused the interference. These findings
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are consistent with prior research concluding that state anxiety refers to how a person
feels in that particular moment, and anyone can feel a state of anxiety without having to
be classified as an “anxious” person. If a low-trait-anxious individual is in a state of
anxiety, it is logical to assume that he/she will experience the same response latency as
that of a high-trait-anxious individual. However, as mentioned previously, trait and state
anxiety also have a reciprocal relationship, such that trait anxiety will inevitably impact
an individual’s level of state anxiety. Thus, while low-trait-anxious individuals will
display noticeably higher than normal levels of anxiety when placed in a stressful
situation, their anxiety levels will not reach the same intensity as high-trait-anxious
individuals exposed to the same stressor.
Overall, both trait- and state-anxiety impairs performance efficiency (i.e. accuracy
plus effort) as opposed to performance effectiveness (i.e., accuracy), as evidenced by
slower reaction times but comparable accuracy on cognitive tasks for individuals with
high anxiety levels. Most research has focused on high levels of trait anxiety instead of
state anxiety when studying this performance impairment. However, Dresler and
colleagues’ study indicates that perhaps state anxiety plays a larger role in this deficiency
than trait anxiety. Thus, more research is needed that is sensitive to the contribution of
state anxiety, and the interrelationship between state and trait anxiety.
Role of Working Memory in Attention
Up until now, the emphasis has been on attentional control and how anxiety can
interfere in this cognitive process. However, attention is not an isolated cognitive
network. Successful performance on the e-Stroop requires cognitive control, specifically
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inhibitory control. The more effectively an individual can inhibit the competing meaning
of the threat word, the faster he/she can disengage and respond. Failure to inhibit
distracting information results in poorer performance because this task-irrelevant
information is taking up valuable space in working memory. Working memory refers to a
system that is dynamic, flexible, and importantly, has limited capacity (Baddeley, 2003).
Working memory is capable of maintaining important information in a temporary buffer
that is continuously updated with new, relevant information (Baddeley, 2003). Previous
studies have shown that working memory is partially affected by anxiety (Qin, Hermans,
van Marle, Luo, & Fernandez, 2009). For example, one particular study found that highanxious individuals (both state and trait anxiety) performed substantially worse, in
regards to less capacity, on a cognitive task focusing on working memory when
compared to low-anxious individuals (Crowe et al., 2007).
The ability to ignore task irrelevant stimuli and/or acknowledge task irrelevant
stimuli and then refocus attention to the task at hand requires cognitive control processes
including inhibition, shifting (or task switching), and updating. Each of these methods of
cognitive control is an example of executive function. These functions are “supervisory”
cognitive processes because they require higher-level organization and execution of
complex thoughts and behaviors in completing cognitive tasks (Alvarez & Emory, 2006).
Inhibition, task switching, and updating are all negatively affected by anxiety (Shackman,
Sarinopoulos, Maxwell, Pizzagalli, Lavric, & Davidson, 2006). Inhibition is the ability to
intentionally suppress dominant, automatic, or salient responses when necessary (Miyake,
Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, & Howerter, 2000). This involves using attentional control
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to inhibit interfering or task-irrelevant stimuli that disrupts focused attention (Miyake et
al., 2000). Shifting/task switching is defined as the “shifting” back and forth between
multiple tasks, stimuli, etc. (Miyake et al., 2000). This requires an individual to detect a
task-irrelevant stimulus in the environment and reorient attention back to the task at hand
as quickly as possible so as not to interrupt the performance of the task. Updating is
defined as the ability to monitor and code incoming information for relevance to the task
at hand, and replacing old information with new, relevant information (Miyake et al.,
2000). This is important in regards to completing a mental task, as working memory has a
limited capacity to hold information in the buffer at any given time. Optimal performance
cannot be attained if working memory is taxed by a failure to inhibit irrelevant
information, shift focus, or update task-specific goals. Even in the absence of anxiety,
working memory has its limitations.
Anxiety and working memory capacity. One of the ways anxiety influences
working memory is its negative impact on capacity. As Crowe et al. (2007) explained,
working memory has a very limited capacity to begin with, and highly anxious
individuals have even less available working memory capacity because they are
simultaneously processing the task at hand as well as processing their anxiety. Lowanxious individuals are able to devote all available working memory capacity to the task
at hand, which results in a better performance (Crowe et al., 2007).
Successful attentional control requires the ability to focus attention on the task at
hand and inhibit refocusing of attention towards irrelevant stimuli. However, it has been
shown that people with high levels of anxiety struggle with being able to do this,
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especially if the irrelevant stimuli is perceived as threatening (Stout, Shackman, Johnson,
& Larson, 2015). This manifests itself in high-trait-anxious individuals by producing
distressing thoughts that are characteristic of worry and anxiety, and these thoughts are
likely to be mentally rehearsed, thus competing with goal-oriented thoughts and actions
(Stout et al., 2015). Furthermore, once these threatening stimuli are processed in working
memory, they may continue to bias attention long after the stimuli have been removed
from the environment (Stout et al., 2015). Threatening stimuli are often given priority in
working memory, which enables a state of worry that persists after the threat has been
removed. This makes it almost impossible for highly anxious individuals to ignore the
threatening stimuli and refocus on the task at hand (Stout et al., 2015). This phenomenon
is not present in low-trait-anxious individuals as it is in high-trait-anxious individuals,
which supports the stimulus-driven attentional control theory that high-trait-anxious
individuals experience greater difficulty ignoring a perceived threat, as they often exhibit
more hypervigilant behavior. Thus, in order to determine if the effect of anxiety on
attentional bias to threat is in part due to the effect of anxiety on working memory
capacity, it is necessary to not only investigate state anxiety on attentional bias using eStroop, but also separately test the effect of state anxiety on working memory capacity.
There are several factors to consider when determining how a particular
individual will perform on a given cognitive task. These factors include trait anxiety,
state anxiety, and whether or not the current condition in which the individual is placed is
stressful or not. Both being placed in a stressful condition and being exposed to an acute
stressor, have been shown to impair working memory in much the same way as trait
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anxiety (Qin et al., 2009). In one study, participants who had been placed under stress
showed substantially longer response latencies than those not under stress during a task
that measures working memory capacity called the n-back task (Dobbs & Rule, 1989;
Gevins & Cutillo, 1993; Kirchner, 1958; Schoofs, Preu, & Wolf, 2008). The n-back task
requires individuals to remember a stimulus that was presented n trials back. Most n-back
paradigms include 1-back (A-A), 2-back (A-B-A), and 3-back (A-B-B-A) conditions. This
is a cognitively demanding task that is difficult to perform, even for people who have no
problems with trait anxiety, and who are not attempting the task in a current state of
anxiety (Eysenck et al., 2005). In the Schoofs et al. (2008) study, stressed participants
showed slower reaction times during the task, but the differences between the stressed
participants and the non-stressed participants were no longer significant by the end of the
task. This indicates that state anxiety has a negative impact on performance efficiency
that dissipates over time. As evidenced by prior studies discussed thus far, it is clear that
there is insufficient research that focuses on state anxiety as opposed to trait anxiety with
respect to attentional bias and working memory. Thus, it is the aim of this study to test
the effects of state anxiety on attentional bias by using the e-Stroop task and on working
memory by using the n-back task.
Mood State. Previous studies that have used mood state manipulation prior to
investigating attentional bias or working memory have shown varying results. For
example, Byrne and Eysenck (1995) found an effect of state anxiety when they examined
whether angry faces in a crowd would be detected more quickly for individuals in the
negative mood induction group as opposed to individuals in the control group, which
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received a neutral mood induction. Those in the negative mood induction group detected
angry faces faster than those in the control group, however reaction times did not differ
significantly between the two groups in detecting happy faces (Byrne & Eysenck, 1995).
The results of this study indicated that inducing a negative mood state (i.e., state anxiety)
affected the speed at which the participants detected angry faces in a crowd, indicating
state anxiety does have an impact on attentional bias (Byrne & Eysenck, 1995).
Ellenbogen and colleagues (2002) found an effect of state anxiety when they had
participants complete the e-Stroop task after a stress induction. Two important findings
from their study were, first, that participants in the negative stressor condition were faster
to shift attention away from negative words than from positive or neutral words, and
second, that attentional shifts away from negative words were associated with the stress
induction (Ellenbogen, Schwartzmen, Stewart, & Walker, 2002). The researchers posit
that the rapid shift away from negative words may have been an adaptive response in an
attempt to regulate emotional arousal (Ellenbogen et al., 2002).
Roelofs and colleagues (2007) also found an effect of state anxiety in their study
that looked at stress levels via an increase in cortisol levels and selective attention to
social threat. The participants were divided into either high or low responders based on
their cortisol levels after the stress induction. Their results indicated that, while low
responders became avoidant to threat (angry faces in a crowd), high responders became
vigilant to the angry faces after the stress induction (Roelofs, Bakvis, Hermans, van Pelt,
& van honk, 2007). Therefore, individuals with high cortisol levels (high stress) became
more aware of the social threat than individuals with low cortisol levels (low stress).
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With respect to working memory, Qin and colleagues (2009) reported significant
effects of state anxiety on frontal lobe activation. In their study, they induced acute
psychological stress by having participants viewing strongly aversive movie material
together with a self-referencing instruction designed to induce a stressful state, and then
had them complete the n-back task. The induced stress led to a decrease in working
memory related activity in the brain, as evidenced through the use of functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI), and further supported by increased reaction time and
decreased accuracy on the n-back task (Qin, Hermans, van Marle, Luo, & Fernandez,
2009).
Conversely, Ozawa and colleagues (2014) altered mood state via the International
Affective Picture System (IAPS), and then had participants complete the n-back task.
Their results indicated that there were no effects of emotion on n-back performance in
terms of reaction time and accuracy (Ozawa, Matsuda, & Hiraki, 2014). In their study,
negative pictures yielded an unpleasant emotional state, which they likened to anxiety.
The researchers posited that the behavioral performance was maintained while under an
unpleasant state perhaps due to the fact that the participants they employed had adequate
working memory resources. The researchers credit the processing efficiency theory,
mentioned previously, in which highly anxious people require greater effort in order to
maintain the same level of performance as low anxious people (Ozawa et al., 2014).
Therefore, the highly anxious people that participated in the study may have had a
healthy brain that was able to help them compensate for the anxious state they were
placed in, and perform on par with the low anxious individuals.
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Given the varying conclusions from previous studies investigating these cognitive
domains, and the pattern of findings showing reaction time, but not accuracy, is affected
by mood state, the aim of this study was to investigate the effect of mood state
manipulation (i.e., induced state anxiety) on inhibitory control and working memory. We
used the e-Stroop to test the effect on inhibitory control and the n-back to test the effect
on working memory. Based on the attentional control theory, it was hypothesized that
individuals who score higher on trait anxiety levels will have slower reaction times (but
similar accuracy) on the e-Stroop task on threat words than individuals who score lower
on trait anxiety levels. Based on the performance efficiency theory, it was hypothesized
that those who score higher on trait anxiety levels will have a slower reaction time (but
similar accuracy) on the n-back task than individuals who score lower on trait anxiety
levels. Trait anxiety was a covariate for both analyses.
Hypothesis 1a: There will be a main effect of mood state induction in that those in the
negative mood state induction group will have slower reaction times, but no difference in
accuracy, on the e-Stroop than those in the neutral group, independent of word type, and
controlling for trait anxiety.
Hypothesis 1b: There will be a main effect of word type in that threat words will
demonstrate slower reaction times, but no difference in accuracy, compared to both
neutral and positive words, independent of mood state induction.
Hypothesis 1c: There will be an interaction between mood state induction and word type
in that those in the negative mood state induction group will have slower reaction times,
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but no difference in accuracy, on threat words, than those in the neutral mood state
induction group, even when controlling for trait anxiety.
Hypothesis 2a: There will be a main effect of mood state induction in that those in the
negative mood state induction group will have slower reaction times, but no difference in
accuracy, on the n-back than those in the neutral group, independent of memory load, and
controlling for trait anxiety.
Hypothesis 2b: There will be a main effect of memory load in that the 3-back (the most
challenging memory load) will demonstrate slower reaction times compared to the 2back, which will be slower than the 1-back.
Hypothesis 2c: There will be an interaction between mood state induction and memory
load in that those in the negative mood state induction group will have slower reaction
times, but no difference in accuracy, on the 3-back memory load than those in the neutral
mood state induction group, even when controlling for trait anxiety.
General Method
Overview
In the experiments reported below, a mood induction technique was used prior to
having participants perform one of the two computer-based cognitive tasks. The tasks
were divided into two separate experiments to ensure that the mood state induction would
last throughout the entire task. It was unclear if the mood state induction would last long
enough for each participant to complete two tasks; therefore each participant completed
one task.
Measures
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Demographics questionnaire and inclusion criteria. To ensure participants
were eligible, inclusion criteria was gauged via a questionnaire assessing whether or not
the individual is over the age of 18, has no psychiatric diagnosis, was not currently on
beta-blockers or other medication(s) that may impact his/her stress response, and was not
currently under the influence of alcohol or illicit drugs. To obtain the demographic data
of the sample, participants were asked to complete a questionnaire assessing age, gender,
race, ethnicity, and years of education (see Appendix A).
Anxiety. The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; see Appendices B and C;
Spielberger, Gorssuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) is a commonly used measure to
assess anxiety. It is a 40-item self-report inventory based on a 4-point Likert scale (1 =
not at all, 4 = very much so) that differentiates state and trait anxiety from anxiety-present
and anxiety-absent components. Twenty items pertain to state anxiety and 20 items
pertain to trait anxiety, thus participants in this study only answered the 20 items that
pertain to trait anxiety. Higher scores indicate higher levels of anxiety. As mentioned
previously, trait anxiety can be viewed as a personality dimension while state anxiety can
be viewed as a situational dimension (Crowe et al., 2007), with both interacting with one
another to ultimately determine an individual’s overall level of anxiety at any given time
(Dresler et al., 2009).
In an investigation of the reliability of the STAI (Barnes, Harp, & Jung, 2002), the
measures demonstrated excellent internal consistency, and the STAI Trait has evidenced
excellent test-retest reliability at multiple time intervals (Gros, Antony, Simms, &
McCabe, 2007). However, it has been argued that the STAI does not adequately assess
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anxiety as distinct from depression due to the presence of a Depression factor (Gros et al.,
2007). Therefore, in order to control for this finding, a depression assessment, the Beck
Depression Inventory, was administered.
Depression. The Beck Depression Inventory, second version (BDI-II; see
Appendix D) is a 21-item self-report measure that assesses common symptoms of
depression based on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 3 (severely—I
could barely stand it). A total score ranging from 0-63 is calculated by summing the
severity ratings for all 21 items, with the higher the score indicating the higher degree of
depression. The internal consistency of the BDI-II was demonstrated to be good (Beck,
Steer, Ball, & Ranieri, 1996) and the 1-week test-retest reliability was shown to be high
(Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996).
Mood State Induction.
There were two valences of mood state induction: neutral and negative. The
control group viewed a slideshow containing 36 neutral images (see Appendix F) selected
from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert,
2008). The images ranged in valence from 4 – 6 (average), and ranged in arousal from
1.4 – 4 (low; Conklin & Perkins, 2005). Each image was shown for five seconds each,
with a 200 ms blank screen between each slide. The slideshow lasted three minutes.
The experimental group viewed a slideshow containing 36 negative IAPS images
(see Appendix E). The images ranged in valence from 1 to 3.5 (low), and ranged in
arousal from 4.5 – 7.5 (high).
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Mood state manipulation check. To assess the efficacy of the mood state
induction, a pilot study was conducted including 20 individuals. These individuals were
first shown the neutral slideshow, and then asked to fill out the state portion of the State
Trait Anxiety Inventory. Next, they were shown the negative slideshow, and asked to fill
out the questionnaire again. A paired samples t test was conducted on anxiety scores for
the neutral and negative images to determine if there was a significant increase in anxiety
levels after the negative images. Individuals involved in the pilot testing were excluded
from the experiments.
Procedure
Participants began by completing the informed consent (see Appendix G), as well as the
demographic questionnaire. Participants then conducted two practice blocks for one of
the two tasks, to ensure they understood the rules. Upon completing the practice blocks,
participants were given the trait portion of the STAI and the BDI-II to fill out.
Participants then completed one of the two tasks, outlined in detail below.
Experiment 1 – Attentional Bias
Method
Participants. A convenience sample of undergraduate students (n = 60) at the
University of South Carolina Aiken, volunteered for the study by signing up through the
online recruiting system SONA. For students enrolled in an introductory psychology
course, course credit was awarded for their participation. No other compensation for
participation was offered. See tables 1 and 2 for power analysis output, and see table 3 for
demographic data.
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Emotional Stroop. A variation of the e-Stroop was used consisting of threat,
positive and neutral words (see Appendix F). The stimuli were presented on a Dell
computer screen using E-prime 2.0 ®. The words were presented in one of three colors
(red, blue, or green). For each trial, a fixation cross appeared for 500 ms then the word
appeared for 1,000 ms or until a response was recorded, at which time the fixation cross
reappeared. There was a random intertrial interval between 200 and 750 ms. The
paradigm had two block types, threat and positive, and these blocks were counterbalanced. In the threat block, threat and neutral words were randomly presented with
equal probability, and in the positive block, positive and neutral words were randomly
presented with equal probability. Valenced words were matched to neutral words for
length and frequency of use (Taake, Jaspers-Fayer, & Liotti, 2009). The task consisted of
two blocks (1 threat and 1 positive), each consisting of 24 trials, for a total of 48 trials.
Participants began with a practice block for each block type with a required accuracy of
70% to ensure they understood the rules of the task. Participants were instructed to
maintain central fixation and determine the color of the ink while ignoring the meaning of
each word. Participants responded by pressing one of three response keys on the
keyboard, and response mapping remained on the computer screen throughout the
duration of the entire task so that participants did not have to memorize each color for
each key. Both speed and accuracy were emphasized. Average reaction time was
calculated for each trial type and emotional block. Only reaction times for correct trials
were used in reaction time analysis.
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Half of the participants (n=30) were placed in the control group and half of the
participants (n=30) were placed in the experimental group via random assignment. Each
group viewed the corresponding image slideshow, and then completed the STAI and
BDI-II questionnaires, and then the e-Stroop task.
After completing the task, participants were given the chance to ask any questions
about the experiment, and were thanked for their time upon leaving.
Results
Mood State Manipulation Check. A pilot study was conducted prior to the
experiment to assess the efficacy of the mood state induction that used negative and
neutral IAPS images. A paired samples t-test was conducted on averaged STAI-S anxiety
scores reported after viewing neutral then negative IAPS images to determine if there was
a significant increase in anxiety levels after the negative images were shown. There was a
significant increase in anxiety scores from before (M = 1.72, SD = .55) to after (M = 2.52,
SD = .76) the negative images were viewed, t(19) = 5.06, p < .001, and represented a
medium-sized effect, r = .69. The significant results of our pilot study enabled us to
extrapolate that those subjects in the negative mood induction group, the experimental
group, would experience state anxiety after viewing the negative images.
e-Stroop Behavioral Data Analysis. Prior to statistical analyses, data were
entered into a spreadsheet, and screened for data-entry accuracy and missing values. All
statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS software (version 24). Only correct
responses on the tasks were used in computing the averages for reaction times on trial
types for each hypothesis, and any reaction times that were greater than three standard
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deviations away from the mean were thrown out, due to being outliers. Of the 60 subjects
who completed the e-Stroop task, four individuals (2.4%) were excluded due to poor
performance (accuracy less than 65%), for a total of 56 subjects. Two separate 3 (threat,
positive, neutral words) x 2 (neutral or negative mood state induction) repeated measures
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) on reaction time and accuracy, with trait anxiety as
the covariate, were conducted. Hypothesis 1a stated that there would be a main effect of
mood state induction on reaction time in that those in the negative mood state induction
group will have slower reaction times on the e-Stroop than those in the neutral group,
independent of word type. The results show that there was a main effect of group, F(1,
26.85) = 15.314, p < .001, in that those in the mood state induction group were more
accurate overall than those in the neutral group, independent of word type. However,
reaction times for the mood state induction group were not significantly slower than
reaction times for the neutral group, F(1.5, 88.47) = 1.51, p = .307. Therefore, these data
provide no support for hypothesis 1a.
Hypothesis 1b stated that there would be a main effect of word type in that threat
words would elicit slower reaction times, but no difference in accuracy, compared to both
neutral and positive words, independent of mood state induction. A one-way repeatedmeasures ANCOVA was computed to compare accuracy for threat, neutral, and positive
words. The results show that there was no difference in accuracy between the three word
types, F(2, 106) = .362, p = .697. Furthermore, reaction times for threat words were not
significantly slower than reaction times for neutral or positive words, F(2, 100) = .064, p
= .938. These data provide no support for hypothesis 1b.
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Hypothesis 1c stated that there would be an interaction between mood state
induction and word type in that those in the negative mood state induction group will
have slower reaction times on threat words, but no difference in accuracy, than those in
the neutral mood state induction group. The results show that there was no difference in
accuracy between the two groups and threat words, F(2, 106) = 2.157, p = .121. There
was also no significant differences in reaction times on threat words for those in the
negative mood state induction group compared to the reaction times on threat words for
those in the neutral group, F(2, 100) = .987, p = .376. These data provide no support for
hypothesis 1c. See tables 4 and 5 for descriptive statistics for accuracy and reaction times,
respectively.
Discussion
While there is a lack of research focusing on state anxiety and reaction time with
respect to working memory (discussed later) and attentional bias, the studies that are
available tend to have mixed results. Some studies suggest state anxiety has significant
impact on reaction time, while other studies suggest the opposite. The present study falls
into the category of showing that state anxiety has no significant impact on reaction time.
Participants in the mood induction group responded more accurately to all word
types than participants in the control group, however, there was no significant difference
in reaction times between the two groups. The vast majority of research indicates that
there is typically no difference in accuracy between the control group and the mood
induction group, however, one study did show similar findings to the present study.
Brand, Verspui, and Oving (1997) found that the least amount of errors on the Stroop
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task was evident in the mood induction group as opposed to the control group. However,
it is important to point out that this study did not include the emotional Stroop task, but
rather the original Stroop task, as well as the mood induction group consisting of a state
of depression as opposed to anxiety.
It appears that there is a discrepancy when it comes to how much of an impact
anxiety has on attentional bias. One argument states that anxiety does have an impact on
reaction time, in that it is slowed down. The process by which this occurs is referred to as
the stimulus-driven attentional system (Eysenck et al., 2007), which is when the anxious
participant is unable to maintain attention on the task at hand, due to the inability to
ignore the threatening stimuli. On the other hand, some research shows that anxiety does
have an impact on reaction time, but in the opposite direction, namely that it is sped up.
Anxious individuals have faster reaction times on threatening stimuli than on neutral or
positive stimuli, suggesting that the threatening stimuli again capture attention more so
than neutral or positive stimuli. Of course, then there is the fact that anxiety can be
broken down into state and trait anxiety, and this leads to even more discrepancy on
which kind of anxiety impacts reaction time, and/or if there is an interaction between the
two (such as described in Egloff & Hock, 2001). However, as discussed later in “Study
Limitations”, there is the possibility that “state anxiety” specifically was not accurately
induced in the participants in this study.
The other argument states that anxiety does not have an impact on reaction time,
as evidenced by various studies, including Byrne & Eysenck (1995), which was discussed
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above. And again, anxiety can be broken down into trait and state anxiety in regards to
whether one or the other (or both interacting) leads to this conclusion.
Experiment 2 – Working Memory
Method
Participants. A convenience sample of undergraduate students (n= 60) at the
University of South Carolina Aiken, volunteered for the study. For students enrolled in an
introductory psychology course, course credit was awarded for their participation. No
other compensation for participation was offered. If students participated in the e-Stroop
experiment, they were not permitted to participate in the n-back experiment because they
had already seen the images once, therefore the mood state induction would not have the
same impact on them if they viewed the images a second time. See table 3 for
demographic data.
N-back. In this paradigm, eight letters (B, F, K, H, M, Q, R, X; Kane, Conway,
Miura, & Colflesh, 2007) were presented on the same Dell computer screen as
Experiment 1, using Presentation ®. Each letter was displayed for 400 ms, followed by
2,000 ms interstimulus interval during which time the screen was blank. Participants were
asked to respond yes or no to items that appear 1-back, 2-back, or 3-back. The blocks
were not counter-balanced. A yes response meant that the current item matches the item n
back. Participants clicked the left button of the mouse to signify that yes the item
currently on the screen matches the item n back. Participants began with a practice block
for each of the three n-back types (1-back, 2-back, and 3-back), with a required accuracy
of 70% to ensure they understood the task rules. Next, participants completed three
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experimental blocks of 48 trials each. One block consisted entirely of 1-back trials, one
entirely of 2-back trials, and one of 3-back trials. Each block was presented a sequence of
48 letters, with each of the eight possible letters appearing six times within the sequence.
Participants were asked to respond as quickly and accurately as possible. The participant
was able to begin the next experimental block when he/she was ready via pressing the left
button of the mouse.
Results
N-back Behavioral Data Analysis. Prior to statistical analyses, data were entered
into a spreadsheet, and screened for data-entry accuracy and missing values. All
statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS software (version 24). “Correct
rejections” and “misses” (errors of omission, or not responding to a target) were not used
in analyses, as these would not provide a reaction time since they do not require a
physical response by the participant. “False alarm” (errors of omission, or responding for
non-targets) reaction times were not used in analyses either, as these are incorrect
responses, and only correct responses were used in computing the averages for reaction
times on trial types for each hypothesis. Reaction times for hits below 100 ms were not
used in analyses, as this quick of a response is often a “knee-jerk” reaction, as opposed to
a purposeful response by the participant. Two separate 3 (1-back, 2-back, 3-back) x 2
(neutral or negative mood state induction) repeated measures analysis of covariance
(ANCOVA) on reaction time and accuracy, with trait anxiety as the covariate, was
conducted. Of the 60 subjects that completed the N-back, 5 individuals were excluded
due to task non-compliance (i.e., subjects not responding according to directions).
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Hypothesis 2a stated that there would be a main effect of mood state induction in
that those in the negative mood state induction group would have slower reaction times,
but no difference in accuracy, on the n-back than those in the neutral group, independent
of memory load, and controlling for trait anxiety. An ANCOVA was computed to
compare the accuracy for those in the negative mood state induction group to those in the
neutral group. The results show that there is no significant difference in accuracy between
the two groups, F(1, 7917) = .045, p = .832. A one-way repeated-measures ANCOVA
was computed to compare the reaction times for those in the negative mood state
induction group to those in the neutral group. The results show that the reaction times for
those in the negative mood state induction group were significantly faster than reaction
times for those in the neutral group, F(1, 1078) = 11.97, p = .001. These data provide no
support for hypothesis 2a, and in fact show the complete opposite of what was being
hypothesized.
Hypothesis 2b stated that there would be a main effect of memory load in that the
3-back (the most challenging memory load) would demonstrate slower reaction times
compared to the 2-back, which will be slower than the 1-back. A one-way repeated
measures ANOVA was computed to compare the reaction times for all three memory
loads. The results indicated that there was a significant difference in the reaction times
for the memory loads, F(2, 1078) = 11.72, p < .001. Bonferroni post-hoc analysis
indicated that the 1-back is significantly faster than both the 2-back (p = .001) and the 3back (p < .001). These data provide support for hypothesis 2b.
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Hypothesis 2c stated that there would be an interaction between mood state
induction and memory load in that those in the negative mood state induction group
would have slower reaction times, but no difference in accuracy, on the 3-back memory
load than those in the neutral mood state induction group, even when controlling for trait
anxiety. One subject was excluded for getting a “below chance” average on accuracy. A
repeated measures ANCOVA was conducted to compare accuracy on the 3-back memory
load between the two groups. The results indicated that there was no interaction between
group and load, F(2, 104) = 1.854, p = .162. A repeated measures ANCOVA was
conducted to compare the reaction times on the 3-back memory load between the two
groups. The results indicated that there was not a significant difference in the reaction
times between the two groups on the varying memory loads, F(2, 94) = 1.385, p = .255.
These data provide no support for hypothesis 2c. See tables 6 and 7 for descriptive
statistics for accuracy and reaction times, respectively.
Discussion
For the most part, previous studies have shown that anxiety (trait anxiety in
particular) negatively impacts working memory; there is not much research suggesting
that trait anxiety does not impact working memory. Furthermore, there is not a lot of
research that focuses on state anxiety in regards to working memory. Thus, this study is
in the minority with its’ findings. However, it does suggest that state anxiety does not
have a significant impact on working memory.
There was a significant difference in reaction times between the 1-back memory
load and the 2- and 3-back memory loads, in that reaction times on the 1-back memory
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load were significantly faster than the other two memory loads. This finding was not
hypothesized, however it does suggest that the 2- and 3-back memory loads were
significantly harder than the 1-back memory load.
There was also a significant difference in reaction times between the mood
induction group and the control group, just not in the direction that was expected. Instead
of participants in the mood induction group being slower, they were actually faster than
the control group. Patel et al. (2015) found somewhat similar results, however the
significant difference in reaction times was evident only on the 3-back memory load, not
the 2- or 1-back memory loads. Participants in the mood induction group demonstrated
faster reaction times on the 3-back memory load, than participants in the control group
(Patel et al., 2015). The researchers induced a state of anxiety via an “aversive loud
scream” intended to be “threatening” to the individual, and then measured this reaction
via eyeblink startle (Patel et al., 2015). However, results from this study also indicated a
difference in accuracy between the two groups as well (lower accuracy for the mood
induction group), which was not evident in the present study. Thus, while most research
suggests that an induced state of anxiety will lead to slower reaction times on working
memory tasks, there are some studies that find the opposite of this finding, indicating
varying results on this topic in the field as a whole.
General Discussion
It is worth discussing the varying results between the e-Stroop task and the n-back
task. The e-Stroop task contains an emotional element to it, while the n-back task does
not. This might explain why the mood induction did not negatively impact the reaction
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times on the n-back task, but does impact the accuracy rates on the e-Stroop. As
mentioned previously, the participants in the mood induction group responded more
accurately to all word types than the control group. This suggests that the negative
emotional content of the words did in fact have some sort of an impact on the
participants’ performance. Thus, while “state anxiety” itself may not have been induced,
it appears that some sort of negative emotional state was induced, which then had an
impact on the participants’ performance. Perhaps this negative emotional state was also
induced in those that completed the n-back task, but since there is no negative emotional
content in the task, we do not see a significant decrease in reaction times.
Another possible explanation for the unexpected results is the “Yerkes-Dodson
law” (Teigen, 1994). Originally discovered by two researchers, Yerkes and Dodson, in
1908, the law generally states that there is an optimal level of “arousal” for an optimal
performance, and that it is possible for an individual to be “over-aroused,” which leads to
a decline in performance (Teigen, 1994). Thus, since the paired samples t-test that was
conducted on the pilot study data showed that a negative mood state was induced, it is
possible that this actually led to a state of “over-arousal” in participants, leading to the
uncommon performance.
Study Limitations
The present study had numerous limitations that warrant discussion. The first
limitation involves the mood state induction. Although the paired samples t-test that was
conducted on the data received from the pilot study shows that there was a significant
decrease in mood state, there is still a possibility that “state anxiety” was not actually
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induced in the participants. The criteria used in selecting pictures for the negative group
was based on a previous study that involved inducing a “negative mood state” (Conklin
& Perkins, 2005), in which the researchers used images ranging in valence from 1 to 3.5
(which is considered low), and range in arousal from 4.5 to 7.5 (which is considered
high). It could be that, while the slideshow induced a “negative mood state,” this differs
from “state anxiety” in important ways, especially in regards to reaction time to negative
(anxious) words.
Ozawa and colleagues (2014) used images from the IAPS to induce a negative
mood state as well, and their results indicated that these pictures induced an “unpleasant
emotional state.” The authors concluded that this “unpleasant emotional state” is
presumably similar to anxiety (Ozawa, Matsuda, & Hiraki, 2014). Therefore, being
“similar” to anxiety does not mean that a feeling of anxiety was actually induced. This
difference might be critically important in future studies focusing specifically on “state
anxiety.” Utilizing a mood induction scenario that focuses specifically on state anxiety as
opposed to a more generalized negative mood state might yield more significant
differences in reaction times.
Lastly, when using pictures to induce state anxiety, ensuring the pictures match
the threat words that are used in the e-Stroop task may prove useful in seeing the kind of
results that were hypothesized. For example, focusing on one specific type of anxious
pictures (i.e., snakes) and then having the emotional words correspond to snakes might
heighten the state anxiety that was induced, which in turn might lead to a significant
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difference in reaction times. In this study, the pictures did not specifically match the
words shown in the e-Stroop, which could be considered a limitation.
In regards to whether or not state anxiety was actually induced, another problem
may be that the STAI that was utilized is not an accurate measure for state anxiety in
particular. Past research (Gros et al., 2007) has indicated that the STAI may not assess
anxiety as distinct from depression, thus the BDI-II was utilized in the present study to
account for this possibility. A Pearson correlation analysis between the STAI and BDI-II
scores revealed that these two are in fact correlated, r = .79, p < .001. Therefore, this
study suggests that a more adequate measure than the STAI should be used when gauging
state and/or trait anxiety levels.
Another limitation involves the number of trials for both tasks. In this study, the
e-Stroop task was comprised of two blocks (one threat and one positive), each consisting
of 24 trials, for a total of 48 trials. Having more trials would have yielded more reaction
time data to be analyzed, which would have made the analyses much more powerful
(Taake, Jaspers-Fayer, & Liotti, 2009). For example, Taake, Jaspers-Fayer, and Liotti
(2009) had six blocks (three threat and three positive), each consisting of 120 trials, and
order of presentation was counterbalanced across participants. The n-back task in this
study was made up of three experimental blocks (1-back, 2-back, and 3-back), each
comprised of 48 trials. In Kane et al. (2007), eight experimental blocks were used (48
trials per block), with four blocks per memory load (they only looked at 2 and 3-back
memory loads). Thus, on top of the smaller number of trials, this study also had only one
block per memory load, while having numerous blocks per memory load may have
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yielded more powerful results as well. Finally, in Kane et al. (2007), the order of memory
loads that were presented were counter-balanced, such that the 2 and 3-back presentations
were alternating, while this study had each participant complete the 1, 2 and 3-back
memory loads in the same order.
Overall, this study did not add evidence to the viewpoint that state anxiety impairs
working memory or attentional bias. Participants that completed the n-back task after the
mood state induction did not show significantly slower reaction times than the
participants that were in the control group, and in fact showed faster reaction times. The
greatest difference in reaction times was between the 1-back memory load when
compared to the 2- and 3-back memory loads, and this finding includes all participants,
not just those in the mood state induction group. Thus, this finding does not appear to
involve the negative mood state induction, and has more to do with the difficulty of the
task.
Participants that completed the e-Stroop task after the mood state induction did
not show significantly slower reaction times on any of the words than the participants that
were in the control group. However, the accuracy rates for those in the mood state
induction group were significantly higher on all word types than those in the control
group. This suggests that, while state anxiety may not have been induced via the mood
induction, some sort of negative mood was induced. This negative mood state may have
led to the participants being more hypervigilant overall during the task. Thus, it is
reasonable to assume that if another form of mood state induction was employed that
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actually induces state anxiety as opposed to a more general negative feeling, that the
participants would have had the outcomes that were hypothesized.
However, another interesting result is that, if a negative mood state was induced,
this led to the participants becoming more vigilant, suggesting that this negative mood
state did interfere with attentional bias, but not in the way that was expected. Instead of
the mood state causing the participants to become distracted so much so that they cannot
respond as quickly, the mood state caused the participants to focus even more so on the
task, leading to more accurate responses. This finding could be explained by the goaldirected attentional system. Perhaps the negative mood state that was induced falls into
the goal-directed attentional system as opposed to the stimulus-driven attentional system,
and thus the participants were able to continue to focus on the task at hand even with the
distractive stimuli. Future studies could examine this finding in depth in order to see what
kind of negative mood states lead to more hypervigilant tendencies and/or which negative
mood states, such as state anxiety, lead to the participants becoming distracted.
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Table 1
Power Analysis Input for an a-priori Repeated Measures F Test
Effect size f

0.23

α err prob

0.05

Power (1 –β err prob)

0.8

Number of groups

2

Number of measurements

2

Corr among rep measures

.25

Nonsphericity correction ε

1
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Table 2
Power Analysis Output for an a-priori Repeated Measures F Test
Noncentrality parameter λ

8.1818667

Critical F

4.0129734

Numerator df

1.0000000

Denominator df

56.0000000

Total sample size

58

Actual power

.8026333
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Table 3
Summary (Means & Standard Deviations or Frequencies) for Demographic
Characteristics and Psychological Assessments
e-Stroop
(n = 56)

N-back
(n = 56)

38/18

28/27

Age

20.26 (5.87)

19.42 (1.83)

Education

12.21 (.65)

12.13 (.32)

STAI

40.09 (10.67)

39.49 (8.51)

BDI-II

12.08 (7.85)

11.11 (7.97)

Demographic Characteristics
Gender (F/M)

Psychological Assessments

Note. STAI = State Trait Anxiety Inventory; BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory, 2nd
edition
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for Accuracy for Correct Trials for e-Stroop by Word Type and by
Group
Word Valence

Group

Mean

SD

N

neutral

1

.92

.19

28

2

.94

.05

28

Total

.93

.14

56

1

.90

.19

28

2

.95

.08

28

Total

.93

.15

56

1

.90

.19

28

2

.97

.06

28

Total

.94

.14

56

positive

threat

Note. Group 1 is the control group and group 2 is the mood induction group.
Note. SD = Standard Deviation.
N = Total number of participants.
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Table 5
Descriptive Statistics for Reaction Times for Correct Trials for e-Stroop by Word Type
and by Group
Word Valence

Group

Mean

SD

N

neutral

1

573.58

78.16

26

2

566.51

96.31

27

Total

569.98

87.12

53

1

579.78

102.88

26

2

569.80

104.14

27

Total

574.70

102.65

53

1

558.47

88.38

26

2

570.52

80.62

27

Total

564.61

83.92

53

positive

threat

Note. Group 1 is the control group and group 2 is the mood induction group.
Note. SD = Standard Deviation.
N = Total number of participants.
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Table 6
Descriptive Statistics for Accuracy for Correct Trials for N back by Memory Load and by
Group
Memory Load

Group

Mean

SD

N

1

1

.90

.15

26

2

.87

.16

29

Total

.88

.15

55

1

.85

.13

26

2

.85

.11

29

Total

.85

.12

55

1

.74

.13

26

2

.77

.11

29

Total

.75

.12

55

2

3

Note. Group 1 is the control group and group 2 is the mood induction group.
Note. SD = Standard Deviation.
N = Total number of participants.
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Table 7
Descriptive Statistics for Reaction Times for Correct Trials for N back by Memory Load
and by Group
Memory Load

Group

Mean

SD

N

1

1

587.92

170.70

23

2

557.49

159.30

27

Total

571.49

163.65

50

1

731.71

258.77

23

2

582.27

185.25

27

Total

651.01

232.24

50

1

688.02

302.40

23

2

648.68

243.75

27

Total

666.78

270.14

50

2

3

Note. Group 1 is the control group and group 2 is the mood induction group.
Note. SD = Standard Deviation.
N = Total number of participants.
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Appendix A
Demographic Questionnaire
Subject ID: _____________________ Age: ____
Gender: o Male

o Female

o

Transgender

Racial/Ethnic identification: o American Indian

o Hispanic or Latino/a

o Asian

o Pacific Islander

o Black or African American

o White or Caucasian

o Other
Highest level of education completed: _____________
Do you currently have a psychiatric diagnosis? (Such as ADHD, depression, or an
anxiety disorder): o Yes o No
Please list any medication(s) you are currently taking:
_______________________________________________________________________
Are you currently under the influence of alcohol and/or illicit drugs?: o Yes o No
If yes, how long (in hours) has it been since you used either?: _____
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Appendix B
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – State
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Appendix C
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – Trait

60

ANXIETY AND ATTENTIONAL BIAS AND WORKING MEMORY

Appendix D
Beck Depression Inventory-II
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Appendix E
International Affective Picture System Slides Used in Each Mood State Induction
Condition
Negative
N = 36
1050, 1275, 1525, 2301, 2691, 2692, 2751, 2811, 3216, 4621, 5971, 6020, 6220,
6300, 6360, 6370, 6821, 6834, 7135, 7136, 7380, 8485, 9002, 9102, 9300, 9341, 9417,
9470, 9620, 9621, 9800, 9831, 9900, 9908, 9930, 9941.
Neutral
N = 36
2191, 2393, 2411, 2579, 2593, 2880, 2980, 5040, 5471, 5520, 5740, 6150, 7000,
7001, 7002, 7003, 7004, 7006, 7009, 7010, 7012, 7017, 7026, 7032, 7039, 7052, 7059,
7061, 7090, 7130, 7140, 7150, 7175, 7185, 7945, 7547.
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Appendix F
Emotional Stroop Words

Threat
Asthma
Collapse
Stress
Panic
Sweat
Anxiety
Dizzy
Suffering
Seizure
Stroke
Ulcer
Worry

Positive
Humor
Fairness
Energy
Honey
Glory
Comfort
Super
Desirable
Ecstasy
Flower
Shine
Smile

Neutral
Helmet
Township
Season
Slope
Clock
Journal
Tenth
Automatic
Cyclist
String
Olive
Grass
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Appendix G
Informed Consent

The Effects of Mood State on Executive Function
Breana McSwain, B.S.
PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND:
You are being asked to volunteer for a research study conducted by Breana McSwain. I
am a graduate student in the Psychology Department at the University of South Carolina.
This research is sponsored by the University of South Carolina. The purpose of this study
is to investigate the effects mood state has on executive function. You are being asked to
participate in this study because you are an undergraduate student. This study is being
done at one site and will involve approximately 120 volunteers. This form explains what
you will be asked to do if you decide to participate in this study. Please read it carefully
and feel free to ask questions before you make a decision about participating.
PROCEDURE:
If you agree to be in this study, the following will happen:
1. You will be asked to complete a demographic questionnaire and self-report measures.
2. You will be asked to view a slideshow, which may contain negative images.
3. You will be asked to perform a series of computer based executive function and
thinking tasks.
4. You will be debriefed at the conclusion of the experiment.
DURATION:
Participation in the study will take one visit. This study visit will last about one hour.
RISKS/DISCOMFORTS:
Loss of Confidentiality: There is a risk of a breach of confidentiality, despite the steps
that will be taken to protect your identity.
Uncomfortable mood state: There is a risk of the negative images that may be shown
inducing a negative mood state due to their content. This discomfort will subside by the
end of the experiment.
BENEFITS:
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Taking part in this study is not likely to benefit you personally. However, this research
may help us understand exactly how much of an impact mood state has on executive
function.
COSTS:
There will be no costs to you for participating in this study.
PAYMENT TO PARTICIPANTS:
You will not be paid for participating in this study.
USC STUDENT PARTICIPATION:
Participation in this study is voluntary. You are free not to participate, or to stop
participating at any time, for any reason, without negative consequences. Your
participation, non-participation, and/or withdrawal will not affect your grades or your
relationship with your professors, college(s), or the University of South Carolina. If extra
credit or research credit is required for a course, other alternative means for obtaining
research credits or extra credit is available, and you may discuss these options with your
instructor. In the event that you do withdraw from the study, please email Breana
McSwain.
CONFIDENTIATLIY OF RECORDS:
Any information that is obtained in connection with this study will remain confidential
and will be disclosed only with your express written permission, unless required by law.
The information will be securely stored in locked files and on password protected
computers. The results of this study may be published or presented at seminars, but the
report will not include your name or other identifying information about you.
I have been given a chance to ask questions about this research study. These questions
have been answered to my satisfaction. If I have any more questions about my
participation in this study I may contact Breana McSwain at mcswainl@usca.edu or
Alexandra Roach at alexandraro@usca.edu or (803) 641-3217.
If I have any questions, problems, or concerns, desire further information, or wish to offer
input, I may contact Lisa Marie Johnson, IRB Manager, Office of Research Compliance,
University of South Carolina, 1600 Hampton Street, Suite 414D, Columbia, SC 29208,
phone: (803) 777-7095 or email: LisaJ@mailbox.sc.edu. This includes any questions
about my rights as a research subject in this study.
I agree to participate in this study. I have been given a copy of this form for my own
records.
If you wish to participate, you should sign below.
_________________________________
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent
_________________________________
Signature of Participant

________
Date
________
Date
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